POLICE RESPONSE OFFICERS - A DANGEROUSLY THIN BLUE LINE? (PART 3)

Following on from our previous post and our report on police response numbers we were pleased to see Her Majesties Inspector of Constabulary launch their new "MYPOLICE" website this week at http://www.hmic.gov.uk/mypolice/pages/home.aspx

We have explored the new HMIC site in some detail over the days since its launch. There is a considerable amount of useful detail presented on the site and we shall be referred to it in future posts. First signs though, are that the HMIC have deliivered an excellent new public information resource on policing in England & Wales.

Trawling the site for information in support of our poolice response article, two reports released this week by the HMIC that are of particular interest are :-

The All Force Police Report Card and the Area Comparison on crime rates.

You can see at a glance how each force is performing overall in key areas of policing in the Police Report Card overview, and see the detailed performance information including forces’ prospects of improvement underlying this in the Police Report Card summary.

The Report card compares police force performance in four key areas:-

1. Local Crime and policing
2. Protecting the public from serious harm
3. Delivering confidence and satisfaction
4. Value for money

 Local crime and policing is subdivided by:-

• Reducing crime
• Solving Crime
• Visible presence in the neighbourhood
• Neighbourhood policing

Protecting the public is subdivided by:-

• Investigating major crime
• Suppressing gun crime
• Suppressing knife crime
• Solving serious sexual offences
• Reducing road death and injury

Confidence and satisfaction is subdivided by:-

• Public confidence : all agencies
• Service delivery
• Satisfactiuon of BME community
• Public confidence : police
• Meeting the Pledge standards
• Perceptions of ASB

Value for money is subdivided by:-

• Number of police officers and PCSO's
• Total cost of policing
• Cost per household
• Proportion of policing cost met from council tax

HMIC aims to provide information that will help answer some of the questions the public want answered about the police such as, How safe am I? What is my risk of being a crime victim? How well are my police performing? Are they likely to improve and am I getting value for money?

It will be an uncomfortable read for some. Their website press release claims that they aim to be fair in their performance assessments, and that when they compare forces, it is against a set of ‘peers’ – similar forces – taking into account budgets, crime profiles, populations and challenges. Performance grades are based on comparing like with like.

The National Overview by Denis O’Connor Her Majesties Chief Iinspector of Constubulary can be read here.

COMPARING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REPLIES WITH THE HMIC REPORTS

We have taken ur previous findings from the FOI force replies and inserted the relevant HMIC data and measurement gradings alongside each force. The results make for interesting reading.

The diagram below can be clicked to view larger or downloaded directly as a pdf by clicking here

We were particularly pleased to see that the HMIC arrived at similar results to our analysis regarding response numbers.

• HMIC found that 42.5% of the police resource in Eglangland and Wales is committed to "Frontline" activity.
• Our analysis had put the "Response" percentage at a maximimum of 42%.

Our report had stated that we felt the 42% was still grossly overstated, as forces had included many operational functions within their response numbers, that are not tradionally viewed as a response function. This is corroborated by the explanatory note from HMIC, which lists the numerous other non response functions included within their frontline 42% number.

From our report on police response numbers the percentage was in fact nearer to 25-30% of the full time equivalent numbers of each force. The report above is sorted in order of the resource committed to purely response duties, with the worst force first in ascending order. It should be remembered that even those forces apparently committing higher numbers to response are subject to revision as those marked with a black arrow contain what we believe to be an overstated response figure.

It is interesting to compare the HMIC figures with the force FOI return percentages. Again it should be born in mind that the HMIC numbers will be based on numbers collated from forces as at 31/3/2009, whereas our FOI dta was collected between January and March 2010.

Part of the HMIC report card measurement process includes a grading for "Visible Police Presence". Again, we thought this weas a useful indicator to view alongside the response numbers. There are many forces graded as good or fair in this area by the HMIC, when there is clearly a low commitment to response policing.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Our findings from the FOI research, supported by this weeks release of data from the HMIC, confirm the frontline police blogs that have long since expressed concern about the lack of resources allocated to frontline policing as opposed to administrative, operational and organisational support numbers.

See for yourself the disparities between the FOI findings and the HMIC performance results.

The new information source from the HMIC site will prove helpful in compiling future analysis to determine whether forces actually deliver true value for money in this area. Frontline officers suspect that the allocation of resources to non response activity is grossly disproportionate, meaning that the vast majority of the tax payers contribution to policing pays for office based non response officers and police staff.

The conseqence of misaallocated resources is that frontline policing is exposed to a massive extra burden that is largely unseen. Senior officers and Home Office strategies manipulate crime statistics and detection rates to project the illusion of improved performance.The general public are cheated out of the full delivery of a police service that their taxes entitle them to. Instead, all the signs are, that for many years, billions in taxes have been funding teams of administrators and auditors rather than adequate provision for frontline services that would go a long way toward solving many of the problems facing our communities.

We will look more closely at the other sections of the HMIC force reports in future posts and analysis.

POLICE RESPONSE OFFICERS - A DANGEROUSLY THIN BLUE LINE? (PART 2)

‘Thin blue line’ - or a very insignificant dot?

PC David Copperfield – “Wasting Police Time”

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

An investigative report based on freedom of information requests

made of the 43 police forces in England & Wales.

Identifying for the very first time . . . . . . . 

How many police officers are ACTUALLY assigned to “response duties”

attending to calls from the public

A few weeks ago we announced on these pages that we had sent Freedom Of Information requests to each of the 43 police forces in England & Wales. Click the link below to read the introductory article.

http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2010/02/police-response-officers-dangerously.html

SOME BACKGROUND TO THE NEW REPORT

Frontline police response numbers is a very emotive subject, both to the officers engaged in that role and to the public in receipt of the service they provide from limited resources.

As a former serving police officer and having seen many media articles on the subject, the topic really hit home when we read “Wasting Police Time” by PC David Copperfield (Stuart Davidson, formerly of Staffordshire Police), now resident in Canada,  who still authors his blog at http://coppersblog.blogspot.com/

Inspector Gadget is responsible for a response team of officers and is among the best qualified and most experienced officers, with a gift for directly addressing the flaws and inadequacies of the present resource allocation strategy.

In his book “Perverting The Course Of Justice” he comments:-

“Thousands of officers who could and should be on the streets deterring and nicking criminals are employed behind desks ‘auditing’ crime reports and managing detection figures. I am concerned that our insane obsession with largely irrelevant targets will eventually cost lives. It probably already has".

Both books make compelling reading, and there are others out there now too in a similar vein. Police blogs we view every day are littered with hundreds of examples, from officers of every force, detailing the impact of real life situations worsened by a critical lack of resource in this essential area of response policing.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUESTS

Early in January 2010, we sent an FOI request to each of the 43 police forces asking the questions:

1. Please provide the total numbers of officers by rank within your force for 2009

2. How many of those officers were assigned to response duties in 2009

3. What are the non response administerial departments within your force?

4. How many police officers are assigned to each of these departments, by rank?

All requests were submitted via the website http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/ which sends automatic e mail updates when a force has replied.

All but five forces have now sent responses :-

• City of London

• Dyfed-Powys

• Gwent

• Lancashire

• Merseyside

POLICE RESPONSE NUMBERS ENGLAND & WALES 2010

 

The responses from 38 police forces are now in. Front line response police officers will not be surprised with the results, facing as they do,  the problems of the job every shift.

 

To read or download the report now click here A copy will also be placed in the "View Our Reports" sidebar to the right of this page.

 

Response Officers know only too well the practical issues surrounding the lack of resources forces assign to this vital role. What they may not know, are the ACTUAL numbers of officers in admin roles -vs- response roles within their force.

 

This report is the first of its kind to explore the problem in depth and report the facts force by force here and now.

 

When the station car park is rammed full between 9 - 5 and looks like the Mary Celeste as darkness falls, you must have asked yourself the questions "Just how many people are tied up behind desks in this force?" and "How many response officers do we actually have in our force area, and how many members of the public are we responsible for?" and finally, "How does our force compare with the other 42?"

 

All of these questions and more are asked and answered in the report and the supportive documents we will be posting on these pages over the weeks to come.

 

The report finally blows the lid off the "Response" scandal. Yes, that's what it is, a scandal, that officers safety has been allowed to be compromised by dangerously low levels of resource, not to mention the members of the public who have been conned for so long about police forces never having had so many officers. Yes, police force strength is the highest it's ever been, but that advantage has been wasted up to now, with so many officers sitting behind desks, auditing other officers, making plans or filling in more forms.

 

The findings in this report are a "must read" for officers and members of the public alike.  

The report contains two spreadsheets that illustrate :-

• The actual number submissions from each force

• An adjusted model, taking into account “overstated submissions” (where forces have stated either Operational totals as response levels, or included non response functions in the response totals). [YES, they did try this!]

Each set of findings are accompanied by explanatory notes, referring to the individual force useful notes in the appendices, and our observations and conclusions.

TASTERS FOR YOU FROM THE CONCLUDING SUMMARY

• Of the 144, 469 FTE officers returned by the FOI requests, at best, 60,181 officers, just 42% are committed to response activity.

• From evidence disclosed by the forces, the more realistic number is in the region of 30% - 43,341 officers.

• Divide that number by four to account for shift patterns and rest days, leaves 10,835 officers to police a population in excess of 54 million.

• Factor in annual leave of 25 days per annum per officer reduces the number still further.

• Factor in sickness at 3.7% and course attendance and you start to get the picture.

• Police officers are spending no more time on the street now than they were two years ago, despite a series of initiatives intended slash paperwork and get them out of stations.

• Home Office figures show that in 2007-08 officers spent just 13.8 per cent of their time on patrol, which does not include attending incidents, down from 15.3 per cent in 2004-05. That is the equivalent of one hour in an average eight-hour shift, or fewer than six in a 40-hour week. Front liners tell us the situation has only got worse since 07-08.

• By contrast, officers spent more than a fifth of their time on paperwork (21.7 per cent), up from 18.4 per cent over the same period and the equivalent of more than eight hours in a 40-hour week.

We take a detailed force by force look at the real population to officer ratios, NOT the fairy tale told to the public by the Home Office.

We look at the Policing Pledge and ask if the promises it contains are sustainable in light of the dangerously low response team levels. (As response teams carry most of the burden of delivering it).  We ask the question... "Would it not have been money better spent putting 131 new police officers on the streets than this wasteful PR exercise that will only service to dash expectations and damage public confidence still further?"

A NOTE FOR POLICE OFFICERS . . . . .

You will find your force response rates on this report, and the population to response officer ratios. Please feel free to comment anonymously about the report, but we would ask you not to make reference publicly about a specific force. We want to ensure your anonymity is protected on these pages and would not wish to see any officer compromised by commenting on their own force.

My contact e mail address is contained within the report and many of the police bloggers and visitors are happier sending their cooments and observations in this manner. Either way, we will not do anything that might compromise your position within your force.

Media sources will be viewing the repport over the coming weeks and we hope that it will keep this important issue in the spotlight and prompt initial steps for the reforms that you want to see.

With best wishes

Steve

Crime Analyst

Nice 1 Limited   

LATEST OFFENCES BROUGHT TO JUSTICE -VS- RECORDED CRIME

LATEST POLICE FORCE DETECTION AND RECORDED CRIME SUMMARY

Combining the NEW 12 month rolling datasets of 'Offences Brought to Justice' and police recorded crime for the period September 2008 to September 2009 in England and Wales, we have produced a composite analysis of the two sets of figures. 

This enables the viewer, for the first time, to compare recorded crime and detections drawn from the same rolling twelve month period.  We will return to this post shortly with our observations, in the meantime, we wanted you to be the first to have access to the reports and our composite report. To view or download our initial report click here or click 1. NEW! in the "View our reports section" in the right hand side bar.

NOTE : As regular visitors will know, we have little confidence in either the British Crime Survey or  police recorded crime processes, having explored in great detail the flaws that exist in both. However, as they are the only datasets currently available for analysing crime statistics, we remain committed to reporting and performing in depth analysis of the data published by both methods.

POLICE RESPONSE OFFICERS - A DANGEROUSLY THIN BLUE LINE? (PART 1)

One of the issues that crops up again and again from police blogger books and numerous blog articles, is the apparently disproportionate number of police officers assigned to admin roles as opposed to response duties.

We have collated countless articles where the complaint is of no parking spaces between 9-5 and how stations become like the “Mary Celeste” when darkness falls (coincidentally when the resources are most needed), as the mass exodus begins.

 

One front liner response to an inspired and emotive Inspector Gadget post sums it up well :

 

"My favourite shifts are nights, weekends and lates after the carpark has cleared of bean counters because the bureaucrats who annoy me and get in the way of my job are gone….and the real work still gets done…..our “intel” section seem to live to complain about response cops and it is TWICE the size of a patrol team! Additionally in twelve years they have never told me anything I didn’t already know".

This got us thinking about how much of an impact this actually has on operational policing at the sharp end. How many of the 143,000 are actually available to respond to public calls when they are needed most? The figure has then to be divided across shift patterns, with courses and sickness taken into account. Is the tax payers money being well spent by those responsible for placing officers on our streets? Or, as front line officers report, are our cities woefully and dangerously under policed, with the vast majority of the wage bill paying officers assigned to 9-5 office based responsibilities.

 

With that in mind, last month we submitted Freedom of Information Requests to all forces, asking for the following information :-

 

1. Please provide the total numbers of officers by rank within your force for 2009

 

2. How many of those officers were assigned to response duties in 2009

 

3. What are the non response ad ministerial departments within your force?

 

4. How many police officers are assigned to each of these departments, by rank?

 

In this two part article, we will detail what we expect to reveal from the requests. In the second part, we will attach the figures and reports from each force, together with explanatory notes.

All but a few of the forces have now responded (albeit in different formats). The majority have been helpful, with only a few seeming reluctant or resistant to provide the information.

 

The responses received are very disparate, in that some provide long lists in excel, others in pdf or word format. In trying to assimilate all the information, many of the forces have referred to certain Home Office terminology. Terms often quoted are :- 

• Operational
• Operational Support
• Organisational Support

Looking at the national picture, there are 143,725 police officers and 79,296 “Police Staff” that we understand to mean police civilian staff.

 

The exercise we are undertaking will shed some light on how many of the 143,725 FTE (Full Time Equivalent) officers are actually available for front line response duties.

 

A number of forces almost refuse to be drawn on the “response” question, sticking to the mantra, “If they are operational, they can be considered response”. The feedback we’ve been getting from the front line is that in practice this simply isn’t practical to say or apply. The most extreme example is that some forces place ACPO ranks into the Operational, Operational Support or Organisational Support. Whilst a Chief/DCC/ACC may appear on the patch occasionally and I can understand their interpretation of Operational for these purposes, they could hardly be viewed as a regular “First Line Response” resource.

 

We had to smile at one force, whose response to the question “3. What are the non response administerial departments within your force?” was :-

“3. No information held. This is because a department is not regarded as being either 'responsive' or 'non-responsive' since all departments within the constabulary will respond to the demands of the present situation. All officers are required to maintain full competency to carry out response duties at all times; this can be best illustrated by the recent arrests made by our Head of Learning & Development (Superintendant) and also by our Assistant Chief Constable; both roles which may otherwise be considered as administerial”.

All credit to them if they stepped out of their bubble to get stuck in, but one incident hardly justifies classifying them as “response”. That’s like saying the true response officers are “organisational support” when they have to stay indoors to fill in reams of paper about public confidence.

The Home Office and ACPO issued guidelines to all forces to enable a more uniform allocation of resources by function. The guidelines contain a list of 61 groups of officers, applying either Operational, Operational Support or Organisational Support as the descriptive label for each function.

A straight lift from from the Home Office definitions of the functions, suggest that the pure response officers fall under paragraph 30:-

(30) Foot/Car/Beat Patrol – Operational – The ACPO Working Group on Patrol settled on the definition: “The overt presence, whether on foot or mobile, of a locally accountable uniformed police constable who provides public reassurance and who is approachable and available to ensure an appropriate response from all the resources of the police service, to the needs and demands of the general public”. Thus, include staff who are predominantly assigned to operational patrol in uniform either on foot, on a pedal/motor cycle or in a motor vehicle (includes ‘Home Beat’, etc). Also include Task force/support group/territorial patrol. Do not include traffic and motorway patrol (see 54) and members of dogs’ sections (see 22).

We will seek to illustrate is how each force uses the resources already at its disposal. It seems a valid point from Copperfield, Gadget, Bloggs and from loads of blog pieces on the subject, that in many a cases, a disproportionate number of officers are engaged in “non response” duties, applying greater strain than necessary of the frontline response resource.

Billions are wasted each year across all the public sectors, on pointless bureaucracy, with thousands employed to create the latest fashionable projects that do nothing to improve the lives of the taxpayers who foot the bill. The explosion of unaccountable quangos (NPIA, ACPO & APA spring to mind), public sector invented “non-jobs” and costly bureaucracy are indictments of a reckless regard and approach to spending other people’s money. Forces should be given what they need to do the job properly, but whilst there is so much spin and suspicion surrounding force resources, crime statistics and Chief Officer bonus payments, it’s probable that forces are actually being under funded, under resourced and poorly managed from the top.

Under the Freedom of Information legislation, the remaining forces will no doubt respond over the next week or so. At that time we will complete our analysis and report fully on these pages. This will enable officers to see, for the first time, the actual number of police officers their force assigns to "response" type duties and those engaged in clerical or office based admin type roles.

In the meantime, consider this if you would . . . .

Force strengths are determined by a number of factors, not least of which is the population and household count. Imagine for a moment all the strategies for manipulating crime statistics were wiped out overnight. In this ideal world, detections are not the important driver they currently represent. Then imagine police recorded crime was actually closer to double what it is now (which is what it is believed to be, due to under reporting). From the force head count, what percentage would you think would be about right to provide a sufficient first line response service? Don’t worry, we won’t hold you to it. We have our own thoughts on the priority of “response” and wonder what the feelings of the rank and file are. It seems from all that is written, that "response" does not seem to receive the resource you feel it needs.  Instinct or gut feeling will do.

We are guessing front liners on response teams will not be surprised with the numbers when they are all in. 

As Copperfield and Gadget have suggested, the problem of frontline resource doesn’t necessarily mean more officers are required, but quite possibly that the existing resources could be more effectively utilized.

CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS AND HOME OFFICE - "COOKING THE BOOKS" OF CRIME

Cooking the books on crime

Is it just a game to Chief Police Officers?

Chris Grayling, the Shadow Home Secretary and the Tory Party were accused of fiddling crime figures this week, by suggesting violent crime has soared under Labour rule.  Shadow home secretary Chris Grayling was accused of damaging public trust in official statistics today.

The row revolves around changes in how violent crime has been recorded since 2002. Instead of police deciding whether an incident should be recorded as violence, the system now requires them to do so whenever an alleged victim asks them to. As a result, the level of recorded violent crimes soared by an estimated 35 per cent in the first year the system was introduced. The Home Office has warned that the statistics for before and after 2002 are therefore not comparable.

Sir Michael Scholar, head of the UK Statistics Authority, also told Mr Grayling his use of the figures 'seems to me likely to damage public trust in official statistics'. Sir Michael said the British Crime Survey, which is based on interviews, provides a more reliable measure of national trends.
 
Chris Grayling said he did not distort statistics and denied any wrongdoing, insisting that the Home Office itself had used the same data set to draw comparisons on other issues. He said: ‘We don't create crime figures. We use the official crime figures published by the Home Office. The Home Office has continued to use the same comparators.’

Mr Grayling said: "Like everyone else we will continue to use recorded crime statistics, because they reflect an important reality; that the number of violent crimes reported to police stations, and particularly serious violent crimes, has increased substantially over the past decade, even taking into account any changes to data collection. The Home Office itself admits this in its internal documents."

Home Secretary Alan Johnson labelled the Tory information ‘dodgy statistics’ used by the party ‘to talk Britain down’. If ever there was an excellent example of "A Pot Calling The Kettle Black" - this is it.
An accurate system of recording is the true measure of how effectively a Government deals with crime. When Alan Johnson stated at the Labour Conference that crime statistics were of least importance, it was a weak deflection tactic, protecting the illusion of reduced crime this Government has spun for so long.

Turkeys Don't Vote For Christmas

Just as turkeys don’t vote for Christmas, Alan Johnson and to an extent, even Sir Michael Scholar are hardly likely to concede that the crime figures are as badly flawed as readers of these pages know them to be.

As you may have seen from our articles from this site based on data from the Home Office, ONS, MOJ, Dft, DVLA and other sources, supported by front line police corroboration, the Home Office process of collating and presenting crime statistics can no longer be trusted as a measure of crime in the UK.

Cooking The Books of Crime

The rot in recorded crime and detections goes back many years. The senior management have long since relied upon their store of tricks for “cooking the books”, or “Gaming” as it has become known. It was interesting to see the retired West Midlands Detective Chief Inspector, Dr Rodger Patrick confirming these practices are still prevalent in the Telegraph article :-

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/lawandorder/6736505/Police-force-tricks-to-fiddle-crime-figures.html

"Cuffing” “Stiching” “Skewing” and “Nodding” are all familiar terms to both the front line and Chief Officers, as methods of manipulating the numbers to perpetuate the illusion of falling crime. We know from our front line contact that the practices remain endemic across the forces. Simon Reed, vice-chairman of the Police Federation said: "This research demonstrates that senior officers are directing and controlling widespread manipulation of crime figures. The public are misled, politicians can claim crime is falling and chief officers are rewarded with performance-related bonuses."

Denis O'Connor, the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, published an official report into the way police record violent crime and admitted the figures may be skewed by "perverse incentives" around government performance targets.

As Dr Patrick discovered though, the HMIC and Police Standards Unit have displayed a general tendency to underplay the scale and nature of the practices. It certainly begs the question as to why there are no examples of Chief Officers being brought to book, or even publicly criticised for this type of crime figure manipulation. Apparently, the HMIC refer examples of widespread gaming to the Home Secretary or police authority, rather than "hold the chief constable to account" because of the risk of political embarrassment.

It seems improbable that Mr Johnson would be amenable to approach on this subject as it would undoubtedly open the can of crooked worms they have cultivated these past twelve years.

We concur with Dr Patrick when he expressed the view that HMIC inspectors should be made accountable to Parliament rather than the Home Office, and suggested they should be drawn from other professions rather than solely from senior police ranks.

The months between now and the end of the financial year are particularly challenging within police circles for reporting crime.  In particular, the challenges and pressure are aimed at the front line rank and file. These months see a marked increase in pressure from Chief Officers cascading down through the ranks, urging officers to “censor” the crimes that are reported. The reason for this is clear. The Chiefs are massively financially remunerated with bonuses for decreased crime and increased detections and this is the last quarter when they can exert pressure down the line to protect their "gravy train" from derailing.  

Over on the Inspector Gadget pages this week, his recent article draws attention to the increased pressure exerted by Chief Officers from now until the end of the financial year.  To quote Gadget :-

“They must not, under any circumstances, get out on the street and find any more crime. Not until the next financial year anyway. All their accumulated leave (and there is lots of it being as we don’t pay overtime any more) is to be taken between now and April. It’s best to have them out-of-the-way, they just can’t be trusted to stay indoors”.

How crooked the system intended to prevent and detect crime has become. You only have to read some of the officers comments on the Gadget post from all around the country to see that the pressure and corrupt practices are rife. Whoever assumes the mantle of Criminal Justice will face a mammoth challenge unraveling this pernicious conspiracy and web of deceit that has been foisted upon the tax payer.

BCS –vs- Recorded Crime

Seriously flawed as it is, the current two level method of measurement is all there is to measure the level of crime. However, when the BCS, based on a survey of 40,000 people “estimates” the crime numbers for 2009 to be in the region of 10 million and recorded crime reflects a little over 4million incidents, there is clearly a massive disparity between the processes. How can the Home Office expect the public to have any confidence in crime levels whilst this continues?

So, please forgive our cynical smiles when Michael Scholar accuses Chris Grayling of conduct that may damage public trust in official statistics. Sir Michael says that the British Crime Survey, which is based on interviews and estimates, provides a more reliable measure of national trends. WAKE UP Sir Michael! This Government and their twelve years of lies and manipulation have crucified any trust the public might have had in crime statistics. Mr Grayling has only peeked into this can of crooked worms up to now, wait until the whole sorry mess is crawling about on the table top for the world to see.

So, what did NuLabour do, rather than choosing the honest, more difficult alternative? We've witnessed them drown the public sector with bureaucratic systems, build management teams to pilot fancy projects, recruit the Chief Officers and management teams, including ACPO to enforce their dirty work and pay scandalous bonuses to elicit their support. They created the NPIA, a police improvement "Quango" to supposedly set high standards for the service, yet now sets the most disgraceful example of wastefulness and profligacy.

None of these have yet proved their value or effectiveness.

It seems this Government will do anything but apply simple common sense back to basics solutions that work.

And possibly the worst internal crime of all, that by far eclipses the MP expenses issue.

Chief Officer Bonuses

We recently examined the 43 police force recorded crime performance levels and produced a report disclosing our findings. We looked at Chief Officer pay scales and bonus structures. In our most visited article and downloaded analysis of recent months, we looked closely at the connection between the illusion of reducing crime and Chief Officer pay.

The Home Office concede that as much as 50% of crime goes unreported. This doesn’t mean the non reported cases do not exist, they do. Furthermore, the police, though not reporting crimes, by reallocating or misreporting incidents are disguising the real problem. How can a Local Authority allocate adequate funding or resources accurately based on such wildly differing statistics?

We have reported in some detail our observations about the process in our reports. (We have the recorded crime statistics going back to 1898).

http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2009/12/top-cops-pay-crime-scandal.html

The above article presents alarming evidence supporting a widespread belief that the manipulation of crime statistics forms part of a conspiracy to deceive the public into believing that crime is decreasing. The orchestrators of this deceit are the Government and Home Office, aided and abetted by senior police officers, who are obscenely rewarded for their part in the conspiracy.

Front line police officers are unable to untangle this web of deceit, despite protestations by many with an informed and accurate perspective at the public facing coal face. Distortion of the figures has led to misallocation of financial and human resources, resulting in the public being deprived of the policing it deserves. The gravy train of police funds has been milked and the “con” disguised through years of bureaucracy, performance targeting and distraction techniques, making the task of basic policing more difficult to deliver.

There is plenty of evidence that there are senior officers who are paid grossly disproportionate salaries and bonuses for perpetuating the deceitful illusion of crime reduction. The honour and distinction of achieving a high rank in public service has been replaced with greed, with a convenient blindness to the immorality of their actions. A full, transparent 43 force public enquiry is needed to force the disclosure of these illicit payments and inducements. Among the most disturbing are the revelations of Heather Brooke in the Guardian, about the perks and expenses of Sir Hugh Orde the president of the Association of Chief Police Officers. The rot is clearly embedded within the “root and branch” culture of the highest ranking police officers, when the man who is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the Chief Officers in England & Wales sets such an immoral example.

The consequences are dire and plain for all to see. The victims in all of this are the tax payer, who is deprived of the police service his contributions are intended to provide, and the front line police officer who is forced into silent acceptance and resignation of a job that has become enmeshed with bureaucracy, risk averse policing and fiddled crime figures. Who could blame officers that have no faith or respect for senior officers and politicians who orchestrate a criminal deception of the highest magnitude for personal gain, and then expect the staff on the ground to do their dirty work with no resistance?

Alan Johnsons’ proposal for cutting frontline police overtime by £70 million is not in the best public interest. A more appropriate target for savings surely lies within the senior officer pay structure. Our report shows that there is plenty of "fat" that should be cut from that source before even considering such an essential as operational police overtime.

We support the proposal that crime statistics should be properly independent. This would remove responsibility for compiling and publishing crime figures from the Home Office, who clearly cannot be trusted to be truthful with the electorate and not to apply their political spin. The responsibility should be placed with the Office for National Statistics which is totally independent. The pre-release access that Ministers and political advisers get to crime statistics should be abolished – so the public would be the first to get an honest account of the facts.

Click here to view our report on the "TOP COPS PAY & CRIME SCANDAL" The report enters into some detail about the secrecy surrounding these payments which serves only to feed suspicion of a boys’ club stitch-up. Chief constables need to be open on pay and perks if trust is to be restored, not only with the public, but also with the front line officers who also feel cheated. Respect for Chief Officers is at an all time low and we have to sympathise with the front line officers who feel they are doing the dirty work of the Chiefs, betraying the public trust and feeling pressured into compliance.

No one should be surprised to see the dramatic changes to the crime reporting processes that occurred during the Labour ministry. What a clever game of smoke and mirrors they have played. Obfuscate, disguise, confuse or even blatantly lie about the statistics to prevent the truth getting out to the public, that they have failed spectacularly to handle the problem honestly and effectively.

The wider public have been well and truly conned by Labour. The police rank and file have become embroiled in a tangled web of deceit. The challenge is a scary one, because it involves the unwinding of many years of conspiratorial, deceitful conduct. But change it must if we are to move forward.

Whoever assumes the mantle of Home Secretary will face many obstacles from the media and Labour, who will not want the truth revealed for fear of the damaging consequences. The fact is public confidence is shattered almost beyond recognition and it will take a supreme dose of courage and perserverence to take the necessary remedial action necessary to start healing the wounds that have been inflicted.

Our recent articles and analytics about crime reporting :-

http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2009/09/crime-statistics-hide-truth.html
http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2009/09/extracts-from-labours-home-secretary.html
http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2009/10/fudging-crime-statistics-is-no-way-to.html
http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2009/10/crime-mapping-is-police-recorded-crime.html
http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2009/10/no-faith-in-police-statistics.html
http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2009/11/home-office-crime-figures-conspiring-to.html
http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2009/12/force-or-farce-police-recorded-crime.html
http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2009/12/top-cops-pay-crime-scandal.html
http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2010/01/top-cops-are-still-fiddling-crime.html
http://thinbluelineuk.blogspot.com/2010/01/national-police-improvement-agency-yet.html